Carbon Offsets and Environmental Impacts: NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and Federal Climate Policy by Cooley, David M. & Monast, Jonas J.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 2 Winter 2011 Article 1
January 2011
Carbon Offsets and Environmental Impacts:
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and Federal
Climate Policy
David M. Cooley
Jonas J. Monast
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
David M. Cooley and Jonas J. Monast, Carbon Offsets and Environmental Impacts: NEPA, the
Endangered Species Act, and Federal Climate Policy, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 377 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/1
01 COOLEYMACROFINAL 3/23/2011 6:16 PM 
 
 
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 
Volume 28                                  2011 Number 2 
377 
 
ARTICLE 
 
Carbon Offsets and Environmental Impacts: 
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and 
Federal Climate Policy 
DAVID M. COOLEY & JONAS J. MONAST*
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The vast majority of federal legislation proposed in recent 
years to address climate change has included a market-based cap-
and-trade system to limit emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs).  
Examples of cap-and-trade bills proposed or introduced in the 
111th Congress include the American Power Act (APA) proposed 
by Senators John Kerry and Joseph Lieberman,1 the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), sponsored by 
Representatives Henry Waxman and Ed Markey and passed by 
the House of Representatives in 2009,2 and the Clean Energy 
Jobs and American Power Act, sponsored by Senators John Kerry 
and Barbara Boxer and passed by the Senate Environment and 
Works Committee in December 2009.3
 
* The authors would like to thank Margaret S. Davis and Nadia L. Luhr for 
their assistance with research and drafting. 
  Each of these bills would 
 1. See American Power Act, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).  Discussion draft 
2010, available at http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/APAbill3.pdf 
(hereinafter APA). 
 2. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 3. See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  Other examples of recent federal cap-and-trade bills include The Clean 
Energy Partnerships Act, S. 2729, 111th Cong. (2009); The Carbon Limits and 
Energy for America's Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S. 2877, 111th Cong. (2009), and 
two bills introduced in the 110th Congress: The Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 
110th Cong. (2007); The Low Carbon Security Act, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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set a limit on the overall amount of GHG emissions allowed in the 
United States (the “cap”), distribute emission allowances 
representing the equivalent of one ton of carbon dioxide, and 
require entities covered by the program to submit allowances at 
the end of each compliance period for each ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e) emitted. The allowances would be fungible and 
trading among covered entities and other market participants 
would be permitted.4
Under each of these bills, regulated entities can also satisfy 
compliance obligations by purchasing GHG offset credits—
verified GHG emissions reductions made by entities that do not 
face GHG compliance obligations under a cap-and-trade system, 
such entities in the agriculture and forestry sectors.  Both ACES 
and the APA, for example, allow regulated entities to use up to 2 
billion tons of CO
 
2e5 of offsets annually, split between domestic 
and international offsets projects.6
The cost containment aspects work in two ways.  First, 
offsets projects, especially those involving land use activities, are 
often less expensive to implement than emissions reductions by 
regulated entities.  Second, in a market-based program with a 
strict cap on emissions, offset credits from uncapped sectors 
create an option for increasing the supply of compliance 
  Offsets play a key role in 
reducing the overall cost of GHG regulations and achieving 
reductions in uncapped sectors. 
 
 4. While most recent cap-and-trade bills would allow unrestricted market 
participation, the CLEAR Act and the APA include limitations on who may 
trade allowances and related derivative instruments. See S. 2877 § 4(b); APA § 
2411. 
 5. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recognizes 6 greenhouse 
gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6).  In order to compare emissions of different greenhouse gases, each of 
which have a different potential to warm the atmosphere, each gas is given a 
carbon dioxide equivalent based on its global warming potential. See 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499 n. 4 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. chap. 1). 
 6. In ACES, there is an even split between international and domestic 
offsets; the annual limit on each is 1 billion tons. See H.R. 2454 § 722(d)(1).  In 
the APA, regulated entities can use a total of 1.5 billion tons of domestic offsets 
and 0.5 international offsets each year. See APA § 722(d)(1). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/1
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instruments.7  Economic modeling demonstrates the effect of 
offsets in an economy-wide cap-and-trade system.  For example, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s modeling results for 
the APA found that without access to offset credits from 
international projects, the cost of allowances could more than 
double.8  In addition, because eligibility to produce offsets is 
limited to sectors that are not covered by GHG reduction 
regulations, offsets can provide opportunities to reduce emissions 
in unregulated sectors.9
A federal agency would be responsible for creating 
methodologies for ensuring that an offset credit actually 
represents the equivalent of one ton of either avoided emissions 
or sequestration of CO
  In order to meet the demand for these 
credits, an offsets program involving projects in the agriculture 
and forestry sectors will necessarily rely on participation from 
many thousands of private landowners and offsets project 
developers.  Allowing unregulated entities to voluntarily 
participate in the program, and thus earn income by selling 
credits, could increase political support and spread the economic 
benefits of the program. 
2.10
 
 7. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
SUPPLEMENTAL EPA ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY 
ACT OF 2009: H.R. 2454 IN THE 111TH Congress 3 (2009) (which found that 
disallowing international GHG offsets could increase allowance prices by 89 
percent). 
  Because offsets can be susceptible to 
certain environmental integrity issues, these methodologies 
would have to address such issues as additionality, leakage, and 
permanence.  Additionality means that the offsets project must 
lead to sequestration or emission reductions that would otherwise 
not have occurred but for the project.  Leakage refers to the 
possibility that emissions displaced by a project will occur 
 8. OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS 
OF THE AMERICAN POWER ACT IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 53 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/EPA_APA_ Analysis_6-14-
10.pdf. 
 9. For example, the agriculture sector is responsible for 6 percent of US 
GHG emissions. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2007 ES-12 (2009).  The agriculture sector would not 
be regulated under ACES. See H.R. 2454 § 501(b). 
 10. See H.R. 2454 § 734; APA § 735 (for more information on requirements 
for methodologies). 
3
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elsewhere; for example an offsets project where a forest is spared 
logging could drive logging elsewhere to satisfy demand for 
timber products, reducing the environmental benefits of the 
offsets project.  Permanence refers to the fact that some offsets 
projects, specifically agriculture and forestry sequestration 
projects, can be vulnerable to an intentional or unintentional 
release of their carbon, possibly through fire, drought, or pest 
infestations.11
The implementation of an offsets program, however, could be 
significantly affected by existing environmental laws, most 
notably, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
 
12 and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).13
If the federal agency managing a carbon offsets program is 
required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
under NEPA or consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the 
ESA before implementing the offsets program or before approving 
individual offsets projects, the program could face lengthy delays.  
Delays in project approval and increased transaction costs from 
complying with these laws could potentially discourage private 
landowners and project developers from participating in the 
offsets market, reducing the overall supply of offset credits.  
Policymakers may need to strike a balance that achieves the 
  Both are longstanding 
environmental laws that, among other things, establish 
procedures to assess the environmental impacts of federal 
actions.  In many ways, these statutes are the cornerstones of 
modern environmental law, providing information about 
environmental impacts and available alternatives, and allowing 
citizens to directly challenge federal agencies’ compliance with 
the laws.  They have also been the subject of significant criticism 
over the years, as compliance can be costly, expensive, and can 
lead to lengthy legal challenges. 
 
 11. See generally Brian C. Murray, Brent Sohngen, & Martin T. Ross, 
Economic Consequences of Consideration of Permanence, Leakage, and 
Additionality for Soil Carbon Sequestration Projects, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 127 
(2007) (for a more complete explanation of additionality, leakage, and 
permanence). 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370H (2006). 
 13. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
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goals of NEPA and the ESA, while also streamlining the 
regulatory process for developing and approving offsets projects. 
Although the 111th Congress did not succeed in passing 
comprehensive climate change legislation, a carbon offsets 
program would almost certainly be included in future legislation.  
The purpose of this article is to examine how compliance with 
NEPA and the ESA could affect a federal GHG offsets program, 
both through the establishment of the program itself and through 
the permitting and approval of individual offsets projects.  This 
information could help policymakers in designing future 
legislation for carbon offsets and the regulation of GHG 
emissions. 
II. BACKGROUND ON GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS 
Examples of GHG offsets projects include carbon 
sequestration in soils through reduced agricultural tillage and in 
forests through tree planting projects.  Because the forestry and 
agriculture sector are not included under the GHG emissions 
cap,14
Analysis of the offsets provisions of the GHG regulation bills 
introduced in the 111th Congress
 offsets can provide an opportunity to incentivize GHG 
emissions reductions in these uncapped sectors.  Furthermore, 
because offsets increase the overall supply of credits regulated 
entities can use for compliance, offsets can reduce the costs of 
complying with GHG regulations. 
15 reveals key differences in the 
legislative language that has implications for how NEPA or the 
ESA might affect an offsets program.  Among the most significant 
differences in each approach is whether the offsets program is 
established under the Clean Air Act (CAA).16
 
 14. In ACES, the forestry and agriculture sectors are explicitly excluded from 
the cap. See H.R. 2454 § 501(b).  In the APA these sectors are implicitly 
excluded, because they do not fall within the definition of “covered entity.” See 
APA § 700(12). 
  This is only 
relevant with regard to NEPA, because actions taken under the 
 15. Unless otherwise noted, the GHG regulation bills discussed in this paper 
from the 111th Congress refer to ACES and the APA. 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). 
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CAA are exempt from complying with NEPA.17
A. Establishment of an offsets program under the Clean 
Air Act 
  This distinction 
is less important for compliance with the ESA, as a similar 
exemption for actions taken under the CAA does not exist for the 
ESA.  The differences between an approach under the CAA and 
other approaches are discussed below. 
There are two potential approaches to establishing an offsets 
program under the CAA.  The first is for Congress to amend the 
CAA to establish an offsets program for GHG emissions.  The 
APA follows this approach, including the entire cap-and-trade 
program and offsets provisions under a new title in the CAA.  In 
ACES, the language establishing the offsets program is divided 
into two parts: one part establishes a program for offsets from 
agricultural and forestry sources, administered by the USDA,18 
and the other sets up a program for offsets from all other sources, 
administered by the EPA.19  Importantly, however, the language 
establishing the USDA offsets program is not included under the 
CAA, and so it would not be exempt from NEPA.20
Although the 
 
APA similarly gives the USDA authority over 
 
 17. “No action taken under the Clean Act shall be deemed a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the 
meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.” 15 U.S.C. § 
793(c)(1) (2006). 
agricultural and forestry offsets and the EPA authority over all 
 18. See H.R. 2454 §§ 501-511. 
 19. See id. §§ 731-743. 
 20. In the debate leading up to the passage of ACES, there was some 
discussion over the role that the USDA would play in the offsets program, 
particularly concerning offsets from agricultural and forestry projects.  In an 
agreement reached between Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Rep. Collin Peterson, Chairman of 
the House Committee on Agriculture, the USDA was given total exclusive 
responsibility over agricultural and forestry offsets. See Letter from 
Representative Henry Waxman, Chairman of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, and Representative Collin Peterson, Chairman of the House Comm. 
on Agric. to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (June 24, 2009), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/ Press_111/20090629/acespresidentletter.pdf. 
See also Allison Winter, Farm Groups Prevail as House Puts USDA in Charge of 
Ag Offsets, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009. 
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other offsets, it does not split the legislative language into two 
parts.21  Language establishing both offsets programs is amended 
to the CAA, and in this case both offsets programs would be 
exempt from NEPA.22
The second approach to establishing an offsets program 
under the CAA is for the EPA to use its existing authority under 
the CAA as currently written to regulate GHGs.  In 
Massachusetts v. EPA,
 
23 the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA 
had the authority to regulate GHGs from mobile sources, and the 
responsibility to do so if it determined that those GHGs 
endangered public health or welfare.  Shortly after that ruling, 
the EPA issued an “endangerment finding” for GHGs,24 which is 
one of the first steps in promulgating new regulations for air 
pollutants from mobile sources.25
Although this process has clarified the EPA’s authority to 
regulate GHGs, it is less evident whether the EPA also has 
existing authority under the CAA to establish a GHG offsets 
program.  There is some research suggesting that the EPA might 
not have existing authority under the CAA to allow use of 
international offsets for compliance with GHG regulations, but 
domestic offsets might be allowed.
 
26  Indeed, the CAA already 
includes the concept of offsets for use in meeting existing air 
quality regulations,27
 
 21. See APA §§ 731-743. 
 so it is possible that similar provisions 
 22. ACES has passed the House of Representatives, whereas the APA was 
not introduced in the Senate in the 111th Congress.  If the APA were to pass the 
Senate, this and other differences between the bills would need to be addressed 
in conference committee. 
 23. Massachusetts. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). 
 24. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,496. 
 25. The endangerment finding issued by the EPA was applicable only to 
mobile sources. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006) (for language on establishing 
emissions standards for pollutants from mobiles sources expected to endanger 
public health).  Once GHGs have been determined to endanger public health, 
the Administrator can also establish emissions standards for stationary sources. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2006). 
 26. See generally, Nathan Richardson, International Greenhouse Gas Offsets 
Under the Clean Air Act (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper, 2010). 
 27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (the New Source Review program of the 
CAA, which allows new air pollution sources to be constructed in areas already 
7
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could be used to allow offsets under new GHG regulations.  
Regardless, however, the CAA is still exempt from NEPA, so such 
offsets under CAA regulation would not be affected.  Again, the 
ESA would still apply since actions taken under the CAA are not 
exempt from its requirements. 
B. 
Other legislative approaches to regulating GHGs have not 
involved amendments to the CAA.  These include the Clean 
Energy Partnerships Act,
Establishment of an offsets program outside of the 
Clean Air Act 
28 a bill dealing specifically with offsets, 
as well as climate legislation proposed in previous Congresses, 
such as the Climate Security Act.29
The following sections assume that a federal GHG offsets 
program is not exempt by statute from either NEPA or the 
ESA.
  These approaches would not 
automatically exempt by statute an offsets program from the 
requirements of NEPA (or the ESA). 
30
III. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
  Furthermore, because proposals before Congress differ as 
to which agency would have authority over the offsets program, 
this paper refers generically to “the implementing agency” or 
simply “the agency.” 
NEPA is first and foremost an informational statute, in that 
it requires federal agencies to assess the impacts of “major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”31
 
above established pollution limits only if the new source obtains pollution 
reductions, or offsets, from existing sources in the area). 
  Adopted in 1969, NEPA provided the foundation 
for modern environmental laws by requiring federal agencies to 
assess the environmental impacts of their actions and creating 
 28. S. 2729. 
 29. S. 2191. 
 30. At the very least, this assumption is valid for the offsets program 
administered by the USDA under ACES.  It could also apply to a future climate 
bill, if language creating an offsets program by such a bill is not amended to the 
CAA. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
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the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) within the White 
House to guide agencies and promulgate regulations for NEPA 
implementation.32  The law has been a model for similar 
legislation in 25 states33 and more than 160 countries.34
Simply by focusing the agency’s attention on the environmental 
consequences of a proposed project, NEPA ensures that 
important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only 
to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die 
otherwise cast. . . . Publication of an [Environmental Impact 
Statement] . . . also serves a larger informational role. It gives 
the public the assurance that the agency ‘has indeed considered 
environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process,’ . . . and, 
perhaps more significantly, provides a springboard for public 
comment . . .
  As the 
Supreme Court stated in 1989: 
35
Agencies need only to demonstrate that they have considered 
the potential environmental impacts of proposed actions; they 
need not necessarily choose the option with the least 
environmental impact.
 
36  In addition to the CAA exemption 
described above, NEPA allows agencies to create categorical 
exemptions, does not apply where compliance would be 
inconsistent with statutory requirements, and is not required if 
another statute serves as the functional equivalent of NEPA.37
Nevertheless, complying with NEPA can be a time-
consuming process.  When an action with potential 
environmental impacts is proposed, the agency will generally first 
 
 
 32. Id. § 4341. 
 33. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 3 (1997). 
 34. See Nicholas A. Robinson, NEPA at 40: International Dimensions, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10674, 10674 (2009). 
 35. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) 
(citing Balt. Gas & Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 
(1983)) (holding that although NEPA imposes procedural duties that force 
agencies to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences, the statute does 
not impose substantive requirements). 
 36. See id. at 350 (stating that once procedural rules are followed, the agency 
can weigh costs/benefits and is not required by NEPA to choose the least 
environmentally-damaging option). 
 37. These exemptions are discussed in detail in section III(B) below. 
9
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complete an Environmental Assessment (EA),38 which is intended 
to be a “concise public document”39 that allows the agency to 
determine if it needs to prepare a full Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS).  If the agency determines that the proposed 
action will not have enough impact to merit preparing an EIS, it 
will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).40
If, however, the agency determines that the environmental 
impacts of the proposed action are significant, it must prepare an 
EIS.  An EIS is a lengthy technical document, often hundreds of 
pages long, in which the agency considers the impacts of the 
proposed action, as well as all relevant alternatives to the action, 
including the alternative of no action.
  At this 
point, the agency has fully complied with the NEPA 
requirements, and it may move forward with its proposed action. 
41  In the process of 
preparing an EIS, the agency must first publish a notice in the 
Federal Register of its intent to prepare an EIS, referred to as 
“scoping.”42  Then, after gathering technical information on the 
proposed action and relevant alternatives, the agency issues a 
draft EIS for public comment.43  Finally, after responding to all 
comments received on the draft EIS, the agency issues a final 
EIS,44 and a record of decision explaining the agency’s rationale 
for proceeding with its action. The considerable cost and time 
required to gather and analyze information on the impacts of all 
relevant policy alternatives can lead to significant delays in 
agency action.45
In the case of complex programs with many individual 
projects, the agency can choose to prepare a “programmatic EIS,” 
 
 
 38. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2010) (for more information on the 
preparation of an EA).  For projects that have been predetermined to have no 
significant impact on the environment, and for those projects that belong to 
predetermined categories that always require an EIS, EAs are not prepared. 
 39. Id. § 1508.9. 
 40. See id. § 1508.13. 
 41. See id. § 1502 (for regulations concerning the preparation of an EIS). 
 42. Id. § 1501.7. 
 43. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a). 
 44. See id. § 1502.9(b). 
 45. It can often take a year or more to complete an EIS. See NEPA’s Forty 
Most Asked Questions, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/40/40p3.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
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which analyzes the environmental impacts of an entire program.  
The agency may then also prepare subsequent EAs or EISs for its 
individual projects to analyze their site-specific impacts.46
Regardless of the agency’s decision to prepare an EIS, 
however, NEPA requirements can expose an agency to litigation 
by parties claiming either that an EIS was not prepared when it 
should have been or, if an EIS is prepared, that it is inadequate, 
omits important alternatives, or misstates potential impacts. 
 
A. Impacts of NEPA on a Federal GHG Offsets Program 
As mentioned above, actions taken under the Clean Air Act 
are not considered major Federal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment, and are therefore 
exempted from NEPA requirements.47
The NEPA requirements could potentially affect the 
implementation an offsets program on multiple levels.  First, the 
implementing agency must establish offsets methodologies, or 
rules that private parties use to develop offsets projects, including 
the rate at which projects earn offset credits and information on 
the monitoring and verification of offsets projects.
  Although the EPA offsets 
program in ACES and the entire offsets program in the APA are 
amended to the CAA, the USDA offsets program in ACES is not, 
leaving it subject to NEPA.  Furthermore, should a 
comprehensive climate bill fail to pass the 111th Congress, future 
climate bills may not follow the same template of amendments to 
the CAA.  Therefore this paper assumes that the offsets program 
is not exempt by statue from NEPA. 
48  Once the 
methodologies have been established and landowners begin 
developing projects, the agency must issue approval for qualified 
offsets projects49 and certify verified offset credits.50
 
 46. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & S. FLA WATER MGMT. DIST., FINAL 
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: FLORIDA KEYS WATER 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM 10 (2004), available at 
http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/projects/project_docs/other_projects_fkwqip/f
kwq_eis_main_body_cover_figures.pdf (covers the entire program, but 
subsequent EAs or EISs are required for individual projects). 
 
 47. See 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1). 
 48. H.R. 2454 § 504(a)(1). 
 49. See id. § 505(c). 
11
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Each of these actions by the implementing agency may 
individually qualify as a major Federal action significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, 
may require the preparation of an EIS before the action could 
take place unless an exemption applies.51  Preparing an EIS for 
the offsets methodologies could lead to delays in initial 
investment in offsets projects, as project developers must wait 
until the final rules are issued.52
A requirement to prepare an EIS before approving each 
individual offsets project, however, could lead to considerable 
delays in the approval of projects and certification of credits, 
especially considering that thousands of projects would likely be 
necessary to meet the demand for offset credits.  CEQ regulations 
also allow agencies to require the applicant (in this case the 
offsets project developer) to pay for the cost of preparing the 
EIS.
 
53
To determine whether an EIS is necessary for any of these 
actions, we explore whether each action in implementing a GHG 
offsets program qualifies as a major Federal action significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment. 
  These delays and added costs could discourage 
participation by landowners and project developers, which could 
reduce the supply of offset credits and diminish their potential to 
contain the cost of GHG regulation. 
 
 50. See id. § 507. 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). See also Calverton Cliffs Coordinating Comm. 
v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating 
that an EIS must be completed before the agency implements the proposed 
action). 
 52. See LYDIA OLANDER ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, 
POLICY OPTIONS FOR TRANSITIONING FROM VOLUNTARY TO FEDERAL OFFSETS 
MARKETS 3 (2009) (for more information on issues concerning investment 
uncertainty for initial offsets projects). 
 53. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c). See also NEPA’s Forty Most Asked Questions, 
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/40/ 40p3.htm (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2011)(explaining that references to “third party contracts” in 
CEQ regulations refers to the preparation of an EIS by contractors paid by the 
applicant). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/1
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1. Major Federal action 
Regulations concerning NEPA drafted by the CEQ state that 
“‘Major Federal action includes actions with effects that may be 
major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and 
responsibility.”54 This includes the “[a]doption of programs, such 
as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or 
plan,”55 and the “[a]pproval of specific projects. . .by permit or 
other regulatory decision[s] . . . .”56
Although individual offsets projects would be developed by 
private parties, their approval and the certification of their 
credits by the implementing agency could also be considered a 
Federal action.  However, the courts have been split concerning 
situations in which Federal involvement is limited only to the 
approval or permitting of an otherwise private project.  In some 
cases, the courts have allowed agencies to consider only the 
impacts of actions over which they exert control, and not the 
impacts of connected actions by private entities.  For example, in 
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray,
  A Federal agency developing 
offsets methodologies would certainly qualify as a major Federal 
action under this definition. 
57
In the Ninth Circuit, however, courts have generally required 
the agency to include all environmental impacts from the action, 
including those from private actions that would not have occurred 
but for Federal agency approval.
 the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit upheld an EIS prepared by U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps) that considered the environmental impacts 
from only the portion of an electrical transmission line for which 
a river-crossing permit was required by the Corps and not the 
impacts from the rest of the transmission line. 
58
 
 54. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. 
 
 55. Id. § 1508.18(b)(3). 
 56. Id. § 1508.18(b)(4). 
 57. See Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1980). 
See also Save the Bay Inc., v. U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 
1980) (the Corps of Engineers needed only to consider the impacts from 
permitting a pipeline to a DuPont chemical plant and not the impacts of the 
plant itself). 
 58. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976) (the 
court required the Bonneville Power Administration to consider the impacts of a 
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In the case of an offsets program, individual projects clearly 
would not be able to move forward without Federal approval.  In 
fact, both ACES and the APA require that projects be considered 
additional, or in other words that they would not have occurred 
in the absence of the offsets program.59
Whether those actions qualify as “major” is more ambiguous.  
CEQ regulations state that the word “[m]ajor reinforces but does 
not have a meaning independent of significantly.”
  Therefore it seems likely 
that both the development of offsets methodologies and the 
approval of projects would qualify as Federal actions. 
60  The courts 
have generally resisted agency attempts at narrow 
interpretations of “major” in the context of NEPA, holding that 
any action with significant impacts should be considered a major 
action.61
 
privately-constructed Alcoa magnesium plant where the federal agency 
contracted to construct the transmission line to the plant and supply it with 
power, “federaliz[ing] the entire project”); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758 
(9th Cir. 1985) (the court required the USDA Forest Service to consider both the 
impacts of a federally-constructed logging road and the impacts of the private 
logging activities that would result from the construction of the road). 
  Therefore, it seems that determination of actions in 
reference to the implementation and administration of an offsets 
program as “major actions” will depend on the significance of 
their impacts. 
 59. See H.R. 2454 § 734(a)(1); APA § 735(a)(2) (2010) (for information on 
additionality requirements for the offsets program). 
 60. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18.  Federal courts are split on this issue.  Some cases 
differentiate between “significant” and “major,” saying that “major” could refer 
to things like cost, planning and time. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 
644 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 61. See generally Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 
(8th Cir. 1974) (the USDA Forest Service argued that NEPA establishes two 
tests: first they must determine if the action is a major federal action, and 
second they must determine if the impacts of the action are significant.  The 
Court rejected this, saying “[t]o separate the consideration of the magnitude of 
federal action from its impact on the environment does little to foster the 
purposes of the Act . . . . By bifurcating the statutory language, it would be 
possible to speak of a 'minor federal action significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment,' and to hold NEPA inapplicable to such an action.  Yet 
if the action has a significant effect, it is the intent of NEPA that it should be 
the subject of the detailed consideration mandated by NEPA”). But see Hanly v. 
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972) (the Court agreed with the defendants 
that “major” can refer to the funding and planning involved in a project, and 
therefore “major actions” may not always have significant impacts). 
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2. Significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment 
CEQ regulations require the word “significantly” to be 
interpreted by agencies both in terms of context and intensity.  
Because the impacts of the agency actions can differ spatially and 
temporally, the regulations require the agency to analyze the 
proposed action “in several contexts such as society as a whole . . . 
. the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality,”62
In addition to context, agencies must interpret the 
significance of an action through its intensity.  CEQ regulations 
include ten factors by which the agency may judge the intensity 
of the action, including the degree to which the action affects 
public health or safety, the degree to which the impacts are likely 
to be highly controversial, and the degree to which the action may 
establish a precedent for future actions.
 in 
order to determine the significance of the impact. 
63
It could be argued that because a GHG offsets program is 
mitigating the impacts of GHG emissions from regulated entities, 
and because in many cases these projects could even bring 
positive co-benefits,
 
64 an EIS should not be required.  Yet, offsets 
projects can have negative co-effects in some cases, such as 
reductions in available water quantity.65
 
 62. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a). 
  In addition, a project 
failure could result in a net increase in atmospheric GHG 
concentrations.  Regardless, CEQ regulations state that impacts 
“may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may 
exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the 
 63. See id. § 1508.27(b). 
 64. See, e.g., Subhrendu K. Pattanayak et al., Water Quality Co-Effects of 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in US Agriculture, 71 CLIMATIC CHANGE 341, 357 
(2005) (finding that carbon sequestration projects could reduce nitrogen loadings 
into the Gulf of Mexico). See also Rebecca L. Goldman et al., Field Evidence that 
Ecosystem Service Projects Support Biodiversity and Diversify Options, 105 
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 9445, 9445 (2008) (finding that ecosystem 
service projects, including carbon sequestration projects, can have positive 
effects on local biodiversity). 
 65. See Robert B. Jackson et al., Trading Water for Carbon with Biological 
Carbon Sequestration, 310 SCI. 1944, 1944 (2005) (found that planting trees for 
carbon sequestration can reduce available water quantity, decreasing stream 
flow in some cases). 
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effect will be beneficial.”66  There have been very few court cases 
challenging EISs of agency actions with beneficial impacts.  
Interestingly, in one such case the court found that CEQ 
regulations on beneficial impacts notwithstanding, the lack of 
adverse impacts from an action by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission prevented the plaintiffs from demonstrating injury 
in fact; therefore, the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue.67
Because the establishment of offsets methodologies could 
enable thousands of new projects and shifts in management to 
occur on millions of acres of land, it is safe to assume the action of 
issuing methodologies would result in significant impacts and 
would require the preparation of an EIS.  The impacts of 
individual projects, however, would clearly differ; some projects 
would be as small as a few acres with relatively insignificant 
impacts, and some projects would be much larger with more 
substantial impacts. 
 
While it is tempting to suggest that smaller projects could 
avoid preparing an EIS, it should be noted that the agency 
implementing the offsets program must account for the 
cumulative effects of its actions.  Cumulative effects are defined 
in CEQ regulations as impacts resulting from: 
the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, 
present, and reasonably foreseeable future action regardless of 
what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such 
other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually 
minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a 
period of time.68
a. Cumulative Impacts 
 
Because the establishment of offsets methodologies could 
enable thousands of individual offsets projects, the cumulative 
effect of which could be significant, the agency must account for 
those impacts in an EIS.  Theoretically, the GHG emissions 
 
 66. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1). 
 67. See Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 457 F.3d 
941, 941 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 68. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 
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sequestered or avoided by the project should completely offset any 
GHG emissions from other entities allowed by the offset credit, so 
there should be no cumulative impact on the overall GHG balance 
of the atmosphere.  However, individual offsets projects involving 
land management, such as tree planting or changes in 
agricultural tillage, can have other—beneficial or adverse—
environmental impacts, including changes to water quality and 
quantity and wildlife habitat, which may be small for individual 
offsets projects but significant when taken together. 
When addressing such cumulative impacts, the agency will 
not be able to give specific information on projects that have not 
yet been developed.  For these situations, CEQ regulations 
encourage tiering of EISs “to focus on the actual issues ripe for 
decision at each level . . .”69
The courts have been somewhat divided in applying 
requirements that EISs account for cumulative impacts.  Several 
decisions in the Ninth Circuit have struck down EAs or EISs that 
omit analysis of site-specific impacts or that improperly tier such 
information to a non-NEPA document (such as a management 
plan).
 Therefore, while the agency could 
issue a larger programmatic EIS for the entire offsets program, it 
might also be required to include site-specific information in a 
subsequent EA or EIS for each project. 
70
Although many cumulative impact cases have resulted in the 
agency preparing a subsequent site-specific EIS, the opinion in 
Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman
 
71
 
 69. Id. § 1502.20. 
 suggests that this 
need not always be the case.  Despite striking down the USDA’s 
EIS for a program to spray for gypsy moths due to lack of site-
specific information, the court stated: “We do not hold that 
federal agencies always must prepare a full and detailed site-
specific EIS . . . . It may be possible to fulfill the requirements of 
 70. See, e.g., Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 811 
(9th Cir. 1999) (a U.S. Forest Service EIS was ruled inadequate because it tiered 
information on cumulative impacts of a timber sale to a forest management 
plan, which is a non-NEPA document); Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. 
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (two EAs were ruled 
inadequate because they did not contain site-specific information about 
cumulative impacts of two timber sales). 
 71. See Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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NEPA with a new [programmatic EIS] that fully discusses the 
risks, effects, and benefits”72 of the proposed action.  In a similar 
decision in the Fifth Circuit, the court said that “as long as the 
agency performs the necessary depth of analysis, the choice 
between a programmatic and a site-specific Environmental 
Impact Statement is within the agency’s discretion.”73  
Supporting these decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council74
b. Potential model for programmatic EIS 
preparation 
 that although an 
agency must consider new information that comes to light after it 
implements its action, a subsequent EIS is not necessarily 
required. 
While the courts have held that a subsequent site-specific 
EIS may not always be necessary, the question remains as to 
whether the implementing agency will be able to sufficiently 
account for the site-specific impacts of many thousands of 
individual offsets projects in its programmatic EIS.  The cases 
mentioned above centered on the failure of agencies to analyze 
the cumulative impacts of an action on a relatively limited set of 
sites.  A better analogy, and a potential model for NEPA 
compliance for a federal offsets program, might be drawn from a 
larger program with far more individual projects, such as the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)75 administered by the 
Farm Service Agency (FSA) of the USDA.  The CRP is a 
conservation program that offers incentives to farmers and 
landowners to implement conservation practices on their land to 
provide soil erosion reduction and water quality benefits.  The 
program has enrolled more than 30 million acres on over 400,000 
farms nationwide.76
 
 72. Id. at 905. 
  While the CRP has completed a 
 73. See United States v. 162.20 Acres Of Land, More Or Less, Situated In 
Clay County, State Of Miss., 733 F.2d 377, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 74. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). 
 75. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3835 (2006) (for statutory information establishing 
the CRP). 
 76. See FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CONSERVATION RESERVE 
PROGRAM: SUMMARY AND ENROLLMENT STATISTICS 3 (2008). 
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programmatic EIS to analyze the impacts of the overall program, 
it is not necessarily required to complete subsequent EAs or EISs 
for each project enrolled in the program. FSA regulations state 
that: 
[i]ndividual farm participation . . . will normally not require any 
major involvement with the NEPA process. The practices carried 
out under FSA programs that might have impacts on the quality 
of the human environment will normally have been discussed in 
environmental assessments or impact statements on the 
applicable programs. However, for those practices that might 
significantly affect the quality of the human environment, the 
county committee shall make an environmental evaluation before 
approval. If the environmental evaluation shows that the 
implementation of a proposed FSA practice on an individual farm 
will have significant adverse affects on the quality of the human 
environment, the county committee will not approve the practice 
implementation until after the completion of the NEPA-EIS 
process . . .77
Although FSA regulations do not require an EA or EIS for 
most individual projects, they do provide for the preparation of a 
site-specific EA or EIS, if necessary, “for an individually 
significant action that is included in a program EIS.”
 
78
In addition, a report by CEQ on accounting for cumulative 
impacts states that in cases where few site-specific data are 
available, the analyst may use qualitative (rather than 
quantitative) evaluation procedures, because “[e]ven when the 
analyst cannot quantify cumulative effects, a useful comparison 
of relative effects can enable a decisionmaker to choose among 
alternatives.”
  However, 
a search for EISs related to the CRP yielded only the 
programmatic EIS, suggesting that FSA rarely, if ever, prepares 
subsequent site-specific EISs for CRP projects. 
79
 
 77. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9(d) (2010). 
 
 78. Id. § 650.7(d). 
 79. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS 
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 41 (1997), available at 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepa/ccenepa.htm. 
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Therefore, while the implementing agency would likely have 
to prepare a programmatic EIS for the entire offsets program, it 
is not clear that it would necessarily have to prepare a 
subsequent EA or EIS for each offsets project.  Although the case 
law on NEPA suggests that programmatic EISs are insufficient 
for accounting for cumulative impacts of agency actions,80 the 
agency could choose to follow the model of the CRP in preparing a 
programmatic EIS and then reserving the right to prepare a 
subsequent site-specific EA or EIS for individual projects with 
significant impacts, where necessary.  This model offers 
something of a compromise in which the implementing agency 
could capture most of the benefits of NEPA by formally reviewing 
the environmental impacts of larger proposed offsets projects, but 
it could also avoid burdening developers of smaller projects with 
requirements to prepare an EA or EIS.  In doing so, however, the 
agency would need to establish a clear threshold relating to a 
project’s size or impacts beyond which an EIS would be required. 
81
However, given that the preparation of a programmatic EIS 
could cause significant delays in the establishment of a GHG 
offsets program, and given that there is some uncertainty over 
whether EAs and EISs are necessary for individual projects, the 
agency may choose to explore exemptions to NEPA.  We discuss 
these exemptions in the next section. 
 
B. Exemptions to NEPA 
Although NEPA is meant to include “to the fullest extent 
possible . . . all agencies of the Federal Government,”82
 
 80. See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 177 F.3d at 810. 
 many 
agency actions are exempt from its requirements. The clearest 
example of this is actions that are exempt from NEPA by statute.  
 81. One potential model the implementing agency could follow is that of the 
Gold Standard, a nonprofit organization that has developed methodologies for 
the certification of voluntary and compliance-grade carbon offset credits.  The 
Gold Standard methodologies include a matrix in which environmental, social, 
and economic aspects of the proposed projects are scored.  Projects receiving 
negative scores must prepare an environmental impact assessment See THE 
GOLD STANDARD, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
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As mentioned above, all actions taken under the CAA are not 
subject to NEPA,83
Most of these exemptions have evolved from NEPA’s long and 
complex case history, particularly from cases in which agencies 
have sought to avoid completing an EIS.  However, an agency’s 
ability to use these exemptions is generally decided by the courts, 
which, like the preparation of an EIS itself, could lead to delays 
in the establishment of an offsets program.  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the circuits have differed in their 
interpretations of NEPA’s applicability, resulting in differences in 
the applications of many of these exemptions. 
 which means that an offsets program 
implemented under the CAA would be exempt from NEPA.  
Nevertheless, there are several other exemptions that an 
implementing agency may be able to employ to avoid NEPA 
requirements for its offsets program if its program is not 
specifically exempt pursuant to the CAA or another statute. 
1. Categorical exclusions 
CEQ regulations allow agencies to establish procedures to 
identify categorical exclusions, which are actions that have been 
pre-determined by the agency to have no significant impact on 
the quality of the human environment.84  These exclusions are 
generally reserved for routine actions, such as administrative 
functions, budget proposals, and educational or informational 
activities, and agencies must develop them under consultation 
with CEQ and publish them for public comment.85  The 
categorical exclusions established by both the EPA86 and USDA87
 
 83. See 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1). 
 
do not include any language that would automatically exempt a 
GHG offsets program from compliance with NEPA.  While either 
agency could establish new categorical exclusions for an offsets 
program, they would likely be precluded from doing so for an 
offsets program or offsets projects because of requirements that 
such exclusions be limited to actions with no individual or 
 84. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. 
 85. Id. § 1507.3(b). 
 86. Id. § 6.204. 
 87. See 7 C.F.R. § 1b.3. 
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cumulative impacts,88
2. Lack of agency discretion 
 and as discussed above, both the issuance 
of offsets methodologies and the approval of individual projects 
have significant cumulative impacts. 
Another possible exemption from preparing an EIS involves 
situations in which a statute’s requirements are so specific that 
the agency lacks any discretion over the action.  In such a case an 
EIS would be unnecessary, because the purpose of the EIS is to 
inform the agency’s decision-making process.  If the agency has 
no choice but to perform the action in a specific manner as 
described by statute, the agency would have no use for the EIS. 
An important example of this lack of agency discretion 
involves the decision by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
on whether to list a species as threatened or endangered under 
the Endangered Species Act.  In making that decision, the FWS is 
limited to considering only the five factors laid out in the statute, 
including the threats to a species’ habitat or range and the 
adequacy of existing regulatory measures.89  In a case before the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 90 FWS argued that the 
statute leaves no room for it to consider the environmental 
impacts of their decision to list the species.  The court held that 
because of the resulting statutory conflict between NEPA and the 
ESA, FWS was not required to prepare an EIS since the analysis 
presented in the EIS could have no influence on its actions. 91
Under the bills before the 111th Congress, neither the EPA 
nor USDA would likely be able to claim exemption from NEPA for 
its offsets program under the first type of statutory bypass, in 
 
 
 88. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 . 
 89. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).  The other factors for consideration in listing a 
species include the overutilization of the species for commercial, recreational, 
scientific, or educational purposes; disease or predation; and other natural or 
manmade factors affecting its continued existence. 
 90. Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 91. A similar decision in Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. 
Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2001) found that the National Trails System 
Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2006)) directed the actions of the Surface 
Transportation Board so specifically that an EIS was not required for its 
decision to authorize a rail right-of-way to be used as a trail, because “the 
information that NEPA provides can have no affect on the agency's actions.” 
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which the agency lacks sufficient discretion over the proposed 
action.  Although both ACES and the APA give specific 
instructions to the EPA and USDA concerning the establishment 
of the offsets program and approval of offsets projects, the 
instructions are not so rigid as to completely remove the agencies’ 
discretion in promulgating regulations.  For example, ACES 
requires the USDA to establish methodologies for domestic 
agricultural and forestry practices that are eligible to supply 
offsets, but only “if the Secretary determines that methodologies 
can be established for such practices that meet each of the 
requirements of this section.”92
3. Statutory bypass 
  Because the agency has the 
discretion to determine whether or not offsets methodologies can 
even be established, its decision to establish and approve those 
methodologies could potentially benefit from the information 
provided in an EIS. 
Somewhat similar to the exemption based on lack of agency 
discretion, an agency can claim an exemption from NEPA if its 
requirements under an existing statute conflict with its 
requirements under NEPA.  This includes situations in which the 
time required to complete an EIS exceeds the time limit for the 
agency’s compliance with its obligations under the other statute.  
This exemption was determined in Flint Ridge Development 
Company v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma, 93 which was 
argued before the Supreme Court in 1976.  The case centered 
around the approval by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) of a statement of record by a developer with 
information on the nature of a subdivision development.  HUD 
declined to prepare an EIS to analyze the environmental impacts 
of this decision because it was required by the Interstate Land 
Sales Full Disclosure Act to approve the statement of record 
within 30 days.94
 
 92. H.R. 2454 § 504. 
  The Court agreed that this constraint did not 
give HUD enough time to complete an EIS, and in so doing, they 
 93. See generally, Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 
U.S. 776 (1976). 
 94. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1706 (2006). 
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set up a broad exemption, holding that “where a clear and 
unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must 
give way.”95
It is not immediately clear whether the implementing agency 
could claim exemption from NEPA under this type of statutory 
bypass.  ACES and the APA include a series of strict statutory 
deadlines for the establishment of the offsets program and the 
approval of offsets projects, each of which the agency may be 
unable to meet if they have to prepare an EIS. 
 
ACES requires the EPA to establish an offsets program for 
domestic sources, including the issuance of offsets project 
methodologies, within two years of enactment of the bill.96  It also 
requires the USDA to establish a program for offsets from 
domestic agricultural and forestry sources, including the issuance 
of methodologies, within one year of enactment.97  The APA 
combines both the EPA and USDA offsets programs and requires 
the establishment of the program and issuance of methodologies 
within 18 months.98
The preparation of an EIS—especially a programmatic EIS—
can take more than a year to complete, and the preparation of an 
EA can take several months.
 
99  Since a final EIS or FONSI must 
be complete before the agency would be able to establish the 
offsets program,100 the agency may be unable to meet the 
requirements of both the climate regulation statue and NEPA, 
and therefore, it may be able argue that this provides an 
exemption from the NEPA process.  However, given how narrowly 
the courts have interpreted statutory bypass exemptions,101
 
 95. Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 777 (1976). 
 it is 
 96. H.R. 2454 §§ 732(a), 733. 
 97. Id. §§ 502(a), 503(a)(1). 
 98. APA § 733. 
 99. NEPA’s Forty Most Asked Questions, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/40/40p3.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 100. See Calverton Cliffs Coordinating Comm, 449 F.2d at 1129 (stating that 
an EIS must be completed before the agency implements the proposed action). 
 101. See e.g. Forelaws on Bd. v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the Bonneville Power Administration was not allowed to claim a 
statutory bypass exempting it from preparing an EIS, because the statutory 
conflict arose only from an “excessively narrow construction of its existing 
statutory authorizations . . .”) (quoting H.R. Rep. 39702-703 (1969) (Conf. Rep.). 
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not at all clear that such an argument would successfully prevent 
the agency from having to prepare an EIS before approving 
offsets methodologies. 
The timeline for the approval of individual offsets projects is 
much shorter as compared to the issuance of methodologies.  
Under ACES, the EPA or USDA must approve or deny an offsets 
project within 90 days of receiving an offsets project plan from a 
project developer,102 it must certify the project’s offset credits 
within 90 days of receiving a required report about the project 
from a third-party verifier,103 and it must issue the credits to the 
project within 14 days of certification.104
4. Functional equivalence exemption 
  The length of time 
provided by these requirements may not even be sufficient to 
prepare a brief EA, let alone a complete EIS, suggesting that the 
case may be stronger for statutory bypass of NEPA requirements 
calling for the approval of individual projects. 
The purpose of NEPA is to require agencies to “take a hard 
look”105 at the environmental impacts of their proposed actions by 
considering all relevant alternatives in an EIS.  However, the 
courts have found that, in some cases, agency requirements under 
other environmental statutes serve the same function as NEPA, 
and so the preparation of an EIS is seen as redundant.  Such 
functional equivalence exemptions have most often been applied 
to actions taken by the EPA.106
 
 102. H.R. 2454 § 506(c). 
  Indeed, one judicial opinion 
states of the EPA: “. . . we see little need in requiring a NEPA 
statement from an agency whose raison d’être is the protection of 
 103. Id. § 507(a). 
 104. Id. § 507(d). 
 105. See Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437, 443 
(4th.Cir. 1996). 
 106. See Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116, 122 (D. Md. 1976) (EPA is 
exempt from NEPA for actions taken under the Ocean Dumping Act); Merrell v. 
Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986) (EPA is exempt from NEPA for 
actions taken under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); 
Alabama v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990) (EPA is exempt from NEPA 
for actions taken under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); and W. 
Neb. Res. Council v. EPA, 943 F.2d 867, 870 (8th Cir. 1991) (EPA is exempt 
from NEPA for actions taken under the Safe Drinking Water Act). 
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the environment.”107  This could suggest that the EPA is 
completely exempt from NEPA requirements; however, there are 
still cases in which the EPA must prepare an EIS to comply with 
NEPA,108 such as certain actions taken under the Clean Water 
Act.109
A similar exemption has been granted to the FWS in its 
actions under the ESA in a pair of decisions decided by the Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits.  Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus
 
110 and 
Douglas County v. Babbitt111 both found that the action by the 
FWS of adding a species to the endangered species list, “furthers 
the purposes of NEPA even though no impact statement is 
filed.”112  In Pacific Legal Foundation the court stated that 
because FWS “is working to preserve the environment and 
prevent the irretrievable loss of a natural resource,”113
From these decisions, it may appear that any agency action 
that protects the environment should be exempt from NEPA 
under the functional equivalence doctrine.  However, a decision in 
the D.C. Circuit made clear that there is no “broad exemption 
from NEPA for all environmental agencies or even for all 
environmentally protective regulatory actions of such 
agencies.”
 it should 
be exempt from NEPA requirements. 
114
 
 107. Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650, (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
  Similarly, the exemption for FWS from NEPA in 
listing a species established by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits was 
not maintained in a decision in the Tenth Circuit, which found 
 108. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 6.100-6.103 (2010) (for the EPA regulations on complying 
with NEPA). See also Notice of Policy and Procedures for Voluntary Preparation 
of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Documents, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,045 
(Oct. 29, 1998) (for a statement of policy by the EPA concerning the voluntary 
preparation of EAs and EISs where they are not legally required, but where 
they would increase public involvement and understanding of the process, and 
where they would aid in analysis of large-scale ecological impacts, particularly 
cumulative effects). 
 109. These include the issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permits under CWA § 402 and the award of wastewater 
treatment construction grants under Title II. 
 110. Pac. Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 837. 
 111. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 112. Pac. Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 837. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Envtl. Def. Fund Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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that “[p]artial fulfillment of NEPA’s requirements . . . is not 
enough” to warrant an exemption from preparing an EIS.115
This split among circuits as to the application of functional 
equivalence exemptions suggests that the implementing agency 
might have difficulty in successfully arguing that its offsets 
program is functionally equivalent to NEPA.  The functional 
equivalence exemptions carved out by the courts have been for 
actions that are environmentally protective and specifically by 
agencies “solely charged with protecting the environment.”
 
116  
However, the actions of implementing an offsets program, issuing 
methodologies, and approving projects are not necessarily 
environmentally protective.  Although ACES and the APA require 
certain environmental considerations for forestry and other land 
management offset practices, including a preference for native 
species and practices that encourage the conservation of 
biological diversity,117 and although there may be some positive 
co-benefits from certain land use projects in the form of improved 
water quality and biodiversity habitat,118 there could also be 
negative co-effects, such as reduced water supply.119  
Furthermore, beyond the impacts of the projects themselves, 
offset credits generated by the project allow regulated entities to 
emit more GHGs.  In fact, a properly executed carbon offsets 
project should have no effect whatsoever on the environment in 
terms of the atmospheric GHG balance; for each ton of CO2
For these reasons, it is not entirely clear whether the action 
by the USDA of establishing an offsets program or approving 
offsets projects would be viewed by the courts as sufficiently 
protective of the environment to be deemed functionally 
equivalent to NEPA. 
 
sequestered by a project, another ton will be emitted by a 
regulated entity. 
 
 115. Catron Cnty. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
 116. Pac. Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 837. 
 117. H.R. 2454 § 510; APA § 735(h). 
 118. See PATTANAYAK, ET AL., supra note 64. 
 119. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 65. 
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C. Discussion 
The establishment of an offsets program and the approval of 
individual projects could be considered a major federal action 
with cumulatively significant impacts to the quality of the human 
environment.  Therefore, NEPA would likely apply to a federal 
GHG offsets program.  However, it could be argued that the 
requirements to report on the potential impacts of the offsets 
program could largely be confined to the establishment of the 
program and the issuance of methodologies. 
Although the approval of individual projects would also be 
considered a federal action, and although the projects would have 
cumulatively significant impacts, the project approval process 
would not necessarily be substantially affected by NEPA.  In 
approving projects, the implementing agency could choose to 
promulgate regulations allowing it to use its discretion in 
determining which projects are either sufficiently large or would 
have a significant enough impact as to require an EA or EIS, 
similar to how the Farm Service Agency administers contracts for 
the Conservation Reserve Program. 
A long history of NEPA litigation has produced several 
exemptions from its requirements, though none of these 
exemptions appear to apply to the establishment of an offsets 
program and issuance of offsets methodologies under the GHG 
regulation proposals considered by the 111th Congress.  However, 
one of these exemptions may apply to the approval of projects, as 
the proposed legislation gives a strict 90-day timeline for 
approval or denial of projects, which is not enough time to 
complete an EA or EIS. 
For these reasons, it appears that the agency implementing 
the offsets program would likely be required to prepare a 
programmatic EIS for the entire program, including its 
methodologies; however, it may not need to prepare subsequent 
EISs for individual projects, unless it deems the project as having 
particularly significant environmental impacts.  This allows the 
agency to take advantage of the analysis provided in NEPA 
documents to determine the environmental effects of larger 
projects, while avoiding placing onerous reporting requirements 
on smaller projects. 
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IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 contains wide-ranging 
provisions to protect threatened and endangered species, with 
implications for the actions of both private individuals and 
federal agencies.  Under the ESA, the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) (hereinafter, collectively or individually, “the Service” or 
“the Secretary”) must establish a list of species that are 
threatened or endangered with extinction, as well as habitats 
that are critical to the survival of such species.120
Unlike NEPA, the ESA includes both substantive and 
procedural requirements.  Whereas NEPA requires agencies only 
to report on and consider the environmental impacts caused by 
their actions, section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that: 
 
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency . . is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
habitat of such species.121
This provision establishes two requirements that could 
potentially affect the implementation of an offsets program.  
First, an agency must consult with the Secretary of the Interior 
or the Secretary of Commerce before approving any action that 
may impact any listed species or its critical habitat.  Second, an 
agency must ensure that its action will not jeopardize the 
continued existence of such species or its habitat.  Each of these 
requirements is discussed in turn. 
 
A. Requirements of the Endangered Species Act 
1. Consultation with the Secretary of the Interior or 
 
 120. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006).  In general, the US Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS) has jurisdiction over terrestrial species, and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) has jurisdiction over marine species. 
 121. Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
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Secretary of Commerce 
Section 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies to consult with 
either the Secretary of Interior or Commerce before approving, 
funding, or permitting any action that may impact an endangered 
or threatened species or its habitat.  The agency must complete 
the consultation before it, or any permit or license applicant, 
makes “any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources 
with respect to the agency action.”122
The USFWS and NMFS have established regulations guiding 
agencies through the process of what has become known as 
“section 7 consultation.”
 
123  Agencies can choose to initiate an 
informal consultation, which includes informal discussions 
between the agency and the Service.124  If the informal 
consultation determines that the action is not likely to adversely 
affect a listed species or its critical habitat, then the agency has 
fully satisfied its requirements under section 7 of the ESA, and it 
may implement the action.125  Approximately 90-95% of section 7 
consultations are completed informally, resulting in little or no 
project delay or modification.126
Alternatively, the agency can prepare a biological assessment 
to evaluate the potential impacts of the action on listed species 
and critical habitats.
 
127  A biological assessment includes (1) the 
results of an on-site inspection of the project area to determine if 
listed species are present, (2) discussions with experts on the 
relevant species, (3) a review of the literature, (4) analysis of 
cumulative effects of the project, and (5) an analysis of any 
alternate actions considered by the agency.128
 
 122. Id. § 1536(d). 
  Similar to 
 123. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.10-402.16 (2010). 
 124. Id. § 402.13(a). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND 
NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 30 (1992). See also Oliver A. Houck, 
Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 689, 692 (1995) (citing 
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES, TALK IS CHEAPER THAN 
WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3-4 
(1994)). 
 127. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (requiring biological assessments for major 
construction activities). 
 128. Id. § 402.12(f). 
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informal consultation, if the biological assessment indicates that 
the action is not likely to adversely affect a listed species, then 
the agency may proceed with the action without a formal 
consultation.129
If, however, informal consultation or the biological 
assessment indicates that the action is likely to have an impact 
on a listed species or its habitat, the agency must initiate formal 
consultation with the Service.
 
130  The formal consultation 
requires the agency to provide the Service with the best available 
scientific and commercial data concerning the action.  The Service 
will then use that data and any other relevant information, which 
may include an on-site inspection of the action area, to formulate 
a biological opinion “as to whether the action, taken together with 
cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence 
of listed species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of critical habitat.”131  The vast majority of the time, 
formal consultation results in a “no jeopardy” opinion.132  The 
Service must include reasonable and prudent alternatives in the 
biological assessment if there is a jeopardy finding.  Even in the 
absence of a jeopardy finding, the Service may suggest 
alternatives to the action and conservation recommendations.  In 
general, the formal consultation process will not last more than 
90 days.133
The Courts have been quite clear on the importance of the 
consultation requirement, and several cases have resulted in 
injunctions of agency actions for failure to properly consult with 
the FWS or NMFS.
 
134
 
 129. Id. § 402.12(k). 
 
 130. Id. § 402.14(a). 
 131. Id. § 402.14(g)(4). 
 132. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 126, at 15; Houck, supra 
note 126, at 692. 
 133. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e). 
 134. See Lane Cnty. Audubon Soc’y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir. 
1992) (enjoining the Bureau of Land Management from completing timber sales 
under the guidance of a management strategy meant to protect the listed 
northern spotted owl, because the management strategy was never submitted to 
the Service for consultation); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1057 
(9th Cir. 1994) (enjoining the U.S. Forest Service from management activities in 
the Wallowa-Whitman and Umatilla National Forests until its Land and 
Resource Management Plans were submitted to NMFS for consultation); Wash. 
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Furthermore, even when an agency properly initiates 
consultation with the Service, the consultation process itself can 
be called into question.  However, the Courts have generally 
limited such challenges to the consultation process, holding that 
the adequacy of the consultation can only be questioned if its 
conclusions are arbitrary or capricious.135
The outcome of the consultation process is used to judge 
whether the agency has satisfied its other requirement under 
section 7, which is to ensure that its actions will not jeopardize 
the continued existence of a listed species or its critical habitat. 
 
2. The obligation to prevent jeopardy to listed 
species 
In addition to requiring agencies to consult with the Service 
over any proposed action that may affect a listed species, the Act 
requires the agency to ensure that its actions are not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in 
the destruction or adverse modification of its critical habitat.136
In an early case in the Fifth Circuit, which is still often cited 
in opinions about the ESA, the court held that agencies needed 
only to consult with the Service and that “once an agency has had 
meaningful consultation with the Secretary of Interior concerning 
actions which may affect an endangered species the final decision 
of whether or not to proceed with the action lies with the agency 
  
This requirement has been the subject of extensive litigation, 
especially because it is not immediately clear from the text of the 
statute who has the responsibility to determine whether or not 
the agency has satisfied this requirement—the action agency 
itself or the Service. 
 
Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (enjoining the EPA 
from approving certain pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) because it failed to first consult with NMFS over 
possible effects on listed salmon). 
 135. See Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1320 (10th Cir. 
2007). See also Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 
F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (overturning a biological opinion issued by the 
FWS because it used an improper definition for adverse habitat modification). 
 136. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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itself.”137  A similar decision in the Eighth Circuit in the same 
year found that “[c]onsultation under Section 7 does not require 
acquiescence.  Should a difference of opinion arise as to a given 
project, the responsibility for decision after consultation is not 
vested in the Secretary but in the agency involved.”138
However, two years after these cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided perhaps the most well known ESA case, Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill.
 
139  In this case, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) was blocked from closing the dam gates on the 
all-but-completed Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project, a project on 
which Congress had already spent more than $100 million, 
because doing so would almost certainly wipe out the only known 
population of the snail darter, a three-inch fish and federally 
listed species.  In its opinion, the court stated that section 7 of the 
ESA “admits of no exception,” and that “Congress intended 
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”140  
Therefore this case strongly suggests that federal agencies’ duties 
go beyond simply having “meaningful consultation” with the 
Service,141 and that each agency action must truly be judged on 
whether or not it will jeopardize the continued existence of a 
listed species or result in the destruction of its critical habitat.142
 
 137. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 
 138. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 139. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 140. Id. at 173-74. 
 141. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 529 F.2d at 371. 
 142. This decision was fiercely criticized by many members of Congress, 
including supporters of the original ESA in 1973.  This resulted in an 
amendment to the ESA that Congress passed in 1978, establishing the 
Endangered Species Committee, which had the authority to grant exemptions 
from the ESA for certain projects. See generally Nancy M. Ganong, Endangered 
Species Act Amendments of 1978: A Congressional Response to Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (1979).  The Endangered Species 
Committee grants exemptions from Section 7 requirements only after 
determining that there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives, the benefits 
clearly outweigh the costs, the action is of national or regional significance, and 
reasonable mitigation measures have been established.  The committee voted 
unanimously to deny the Tellico Dam Project an exemption from the ESA.  The 
project was eventually completed, however, after Rep. John Duncan attached a 
rider to the annual public works appropriation bill in 1979, which exempted the 
project from the ESA. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency 
Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747, 783 (1982). 
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Subsequent cases have clarified, however, that the action 
agency, and not the Service, retains the final authority to 
determine whether it has complied with its responsibility under 
section 7(a)(2), provided it is using the best available scientific 
and commercial data.143  Any challenges to such agency 
determinations must show that they were arbitrary and 
capricious.144
B. Impacts of the ESA on a Federal GHG Offsets Program 
  Therefore, although an agency must demonstrate 
that it has complied with its requirements under section 7, it is 
generally given deference to make the determination for itself 
that the requirements have been satisfied. 
With the ESA, Congress sought to protect threatened and 
endangered species, and prevent their extinction.  The 
requirements of the statute are wide-ranging and can affect many 
agency actions, including, potentially, a federal GHG offsets 
program.  In order to comply with the letter and intent of the law, 
the agency implementing the offsets program will need to balance 
its critical duty to protect listed species and their habitat with its 
obligations to establish and administer the offsets program. 
 
 143. See Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 
(1st Cir. 1982) (holding that an agency action that receives a jeopardy opinion 
can move forward once it has completed all “practicable” scientific studies); Stop 
H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1460 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Federal 
Highway Administration “cannot abrogate its responsibility [to the Service] to 
decide whether it has taken all possible action” to protect listed species); 
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 
1990) (citing Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442) (“A federal agency cannot 
abrogate its responsibility to ensure that its actions will not jeopardize a listed 
species; its decision to rely on a FWS biological opinion must not have been 
arbitrary or capricious . . . Nonetheless, even when the FWS's opinion is based 
on ‘admittedly weak’ information, another agency's reliance on that opinion will 
satisfy its obligations under the Act . . .”). But see N. M. ex rel. Bill Richardson v. 
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 700 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Despite the name, 
consultation is more than a mere procedural requirement, as it allows FWS to 
impose substantive constraints on the other agency's action if necessary to limit 
the impact upon an endangered species.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (enjoining a 
project by the US Army Corps of Engineers, because its decision not to reinitiate 
consultation with USFWS after the issuance of a jeopardy opinion was found to 
be arbitrary and capricious). 
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Similar to the impacts of NEPA on a federal GHG offsets 
program, consultations with the Service under the ESA could 
lead to significant delays in the establishment of the offsets 
program and the issuance of offsets methodologies.  The ESA 
requires agencies to fully satisfy their obligations under section 
7(a)(2) before committing resources to show that their actions are 
not likely to jeopardize any listed species or destroy their critical 
habitat.145
While such consultations could lead to delays if they are 
required before the establishment of the offsets program, they 
could be even more disruptive if they are required before the 
approval of individual projects.  Like NEPA, delays in project 
approval could increase transaction costs and discourage 
landowner participation in the market, decreasing overall supply 
of offset credits and increasing the costs of complying with GHG 
regulations.  However, landowners can also have a much more 
negative view of the ESA requirements than NEPA requirements.  
Because the ESA can lead to restrictions of land management on 
private land, landowners have incentives to discourage listed 
species from taking residence on their land.
  This means that all informal and formal consultations 
would have to occur before the implementing agency could 
establish the program, issue methodologies, or approve individual 
projects. 
 146  Furthermore, 
studies have found that landowners often do not give permission 
to government agencies to survey for listed species on their 
property.147
 
 145. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.09. 
  For these reasons, a requirement to consult with the 
Service, which in certain cases may include a visit to the 
landowner’s property to inspect for the presence of a listed 
 146. See Dean Lueck & Jeffery A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J. L. & ECON. 27, 30 (2003) (finding that 
the closer a property is to known locations of endangered red-cockaded 
woodpeckers, the more likely the property is to be harvested, often at a younger 
than optimum age). 
 147. See Amara Brook, Michaela Zint, & Raymond de Young, Landowners’ 
Responses to an Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for 
Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638, 1643 (2003) 
(finding that 56% of survey respondents had not given or would not give 
permission to allow a biological survey for endangered Preble’s meadow jumping 
mice; 14% of respondents said they managed their land to minimize the chance 
of the species living on it). 
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species,148 could discourage landowners from participating in the 
carbon market.149
However, it is not clear whether consultation with the 
Service would be required before the approval of individual 
projects.  If it were required, it seems likely that in the vast 
majority of cases, the consultation could be conducted informally, 
with minimal or no direct involvement by the landowner.  
Nevertheless, there are several steps an agency can take to 
streamline compliance with the ESA, in order to minimize 
disruption to agency actions, while still ensuring protection of 
listed species.  These steps are discussed below. 
 
C. Options for complying with the ESA’s consultation 
requirements in approving offsets projects 
1. Internal agency review 
The most straightforward option for streamlining the 
consultation process is for the agency itself to screen out permit 
applications that are obviously not likely to adversely affect a 
listed species.  The ESA regulations on consultations state that 
“[e]ach Federal agency shall review its actions . . . to determine 
whether any action may affect listed species or critical 
habitat.”150
This model is followed by the Corps of Engineers in their 
approval of wetland mitigation permits under section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act.
  Therefore, the agency itself would have the 
discretion to determine whether its proposed action would result 
in impacts to listed species or critical habitat. 
151  Corps regulations state that if the district 
engineer determines that the mitigation project will not impact a 
listed species or its habitat, then consultation with the Service is 
not necessary.152
 
 148. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(1). 
  If the district engineer determines that the 
 149. However, given sufficiently high payments for GHG offset credits, some 
landowners may choose to accept risks of ESA regulation of their land. 
 150. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). 
 151. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
 152. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(b)(5) (2010). 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/1
01 COOLEYMACROFINAL 3/23/2011  6:16 PM 
2011] CARBON OFFSETS 413 
 
project may impact a listed species, then the Corps will initiate 
formal consultation.153
The implementing agency could follow a similar model in 
approving projects under an offsets program.  The agency would 
need only to consult with the Service on a small minority of 
projects that may affect listed species. 
 
For some more complex actions, however, the agency may not 
have the expertise to determine on its own whether the proposed 
action may affect a listed species.  Furthermore, using only its 
discretion to decide whether consultation is necessary, rather 
than a formal decision-making framework, could leave the agency 
vulnerable to lawsuits from citizens second-guessing its decisions.  
Therefore, there are at least two other options in which a more 
formal arrangement between the agency and the Service can be 
arranged to help guide agency actions through the Section 7 
consultation requirements.  Both are discussed below. 
2. Programmatic biological assessments 
Although the ESA regulations give agencies the discretion to 
determine whether or not consultation with the Service is 
necessary, some agencies go ahead and prepare a biological 
assessment to cover programs that may have impacts on listed 
species.  Similar to a programmatic EIS under NEPA, a 
programmatic biological assessment refers to a single document 
covering a large program, which may have many individual 
projects.  These programmatic biological assessments can be 
written so that common project types are exempt from 
consultation. 
The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) 
administers several conservation incentive programs, including 
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the 
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), each of which can have 
hundreds or thousands of individual projects.  Because section 7 
consultation with the Service for each project could be 
impractical, NRCS, in some cases, prepares a single biological 
assessment to cover all of its programs within a state. 
 
 153. Id. 
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For example, the programmatic biological assessment for the 
state of Montana establishes a screen in which relatively simple, 
straightforward projects receive a determination that an action is 
“not likely to adversely affect” a listed species.154
The programmatic biological assessment has the advantage 
of formalizing the agency’s process for deciding whether to 
consult with the Service.  If the agency implementing the offsets 
program determines that a specific offsets project type, such as 
reduced agricultural tillage, is unlikely to impact listed species, it 
can make that clear in its biological assessment.  Through the 
biological assessment, the agency can seek preemptive approval 
of its decision-making process from the Service to avoid later 
legal action. 
  More complex 
projects must still go through standard consultation.  Each year, 
the Service audits a subset of projects to determine if the screen 
is being applied properly. 
3. Counterpart regulations 
In an even more formal approach to addressing consultation 
requirements for large-scale programs, the ESA regulations allow 
for the establishment of “counterpart regulations” specific to the 
needs of the program.155  Thus far, such regulations have been 
established for only two programs: the National Fire Plan156 and 
actions by the EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).157
 
 154. See Programmatic Biological Assessment Overview, NAT. RESOURCES 
CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC, http://www.mt.nrcs.usda.gov/ 
technical/ecs/biology/programmatic.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 
 155. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (“The consultation procedures set forth in this part 
may be superseded for a particular Federal agency by joint counterpart 
regulations among that agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service.”). 
 156. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.30-402.34 (providing counterpart regulations 
concerning consultations under the National Fire Plan). See also Joint 
Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 
Fed. Reg. 68,254 (Dec. 8, 2003). 
 157. See id. §§ 402.40-402.49 (providing counterpart regulations concerning 
consultations under FIFRA). See also 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2006) (for the text of 
FIFRA). 
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The National Fire Plan is a collection of documents governing 
federal wildfire policy, including the Healthy Forests Restoration 
Act (HFRA), passed by Congress in 2003.158  Part of the Act 
includes the Healthy Forests Reserve Program, which, among 
other things, provides incentives to landowners to restore 
habitats of federally listed species.159  Because these projects will 
necessarily affect listed species and their habitats, it follows that 
they would require consultation with the Service.  In order to 
streamline the review process, however, counterpart regulations 
were established to “eliminate the need . . . to conduct informal 
consultation.”160  In these counterpart regulations, staff of 
various federal land management agencies, including the U.S. 
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management, receive training 
by the Service to make determinations about projects that are not 
likely to adversely affect listed species.161
The agency implementing the offsets program may choose to 
establish similar counterpart regulations with the Service, if it 
predicts that the administration of section 7 consultations would 
be excessively burdensome.  Such counterpart regulations are 
still subject to normal notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act,
 
162
D. Issues concerning jeopardy determinations in offsets 
projects 
 which 
could delay the initial establishment of the offsets program, but 
may also simplify its overall administration by reducing the need 
to consult authorities outside of the agency on ESA-related 
issues. 
Section 7 not only requires that agencies consult with the 
Service regarding proposed actions, but also requires that 
agencies ensure that their actions will not jeopardize the 
continued existence of listed species or their critical habitats.  If, 
 
 158. See Healthy Forests Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6591 (2006). 
 159. See id. § 6574. 
 160. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation 
Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 68,255. 
 161. 50 C.F.R. § 402.33. 
 162. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
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after a consultation, the Service issues a jeopardy determination 
to an agency for its action, it can be difficult for the agency to 
justify that action as fully complying with section 7.  Therefore, in 
administering an offsets program, the implementing agency could 
face (admittedly rare)163 situations in which a project would have 
to be denied—not for reasons concerning the regulations of the 
offsets program—but because the project would run afoul of the 
jeopardy requirement of the ESA.164  Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding Chief Justice Warren Burger’s claim that section 
7 “admits of no exception,”165
1. The Endangered Species Committee 
 there are certain exemptions that 
have evolved over the years that allow agency actions to move 
forward even under a jeopardy determination. 
In the aftermath of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, in 
which a nearly completed multimillion dollar dam project on the 
Little Tennessee River was halted to preserve the snail darter, 
Congress amended the ESA to create the Endangered Species 
Committee,166 which has the authority to exempt an agency from 
section 7 regulation.  In effect, the committee has the authority to 
allow an extinction of a species, earning them the nickname “the 
God Squad.”167
 
 163. Analysis of nearly 100,000 section 7 consultations over a five-year period 
in the 1990s found only 54 projects terminated due to jeopardy determinations, 
or 0.054 percent of all consultations.  See Houck, supra note 126, at 692. 
  In practice, however, the committee has only met 
six times from 1978 through 2007, granting a full exemption in 
 164. However, in issuing a jeopardy opinion, the Service must also provide any 
reasonable and prudent alternatives. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3).  It is possible 
that an offsets project could still move forward employing one of these 
alternatives. 
 165. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 173. 
 166. The Endangered Species Committee is comprised of the Secretary of 
Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the EPA, the Secretary of the Interior, 
the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
and one individual appointed by the President from each affected state. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3). 
 167. See generally Jared des Rosiers, The Exemption Process Under the 
Endangered Species Act: How the “God Squad” Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 825 (1991). 
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one case, and a partial exemption in another case; all other cases 
were either denied exemptions or withdrawn.168
This approach does not seem to be a promising option for 
offsets projects with the potential to jeopardize listed species or 
destroy critical habitats.  First, applications for exemptions and 
approvals by the committee are exceedingly rare.  Second, the 
committee must find that “there are no reasonable and prudent 
alternatives to the agency action.”
 
169
Offsets are not required by any proposed legislation; they are 
simply another option for complying with regulations that can 
reduce the overall cost of compliance.  Furthermore, the number 
of offsets projects that would receive a jeopardy determination is 
likely to be extremely small.  Therefore, there will likely be plenty 
of alternatives, not only for compliance with GHG regulations, 
but also for purchasing offsets.  This makes it highly unlikely 
that the committee would grant an exemption from section 7. 
 
2. Incidental take permits 
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits any individual from “taking” 
any listed species,170 which includes direct harm to or 
harassment of species,171 or adverse habitat modification.172  
However, Section 10 of the Act allows the Secretary to grant a 
permit to an individual to take a listed species, “if such taking is 
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an 
otherwise lawful activity.”173
These permits, known as “incidental take permits,” require 
landowners to develop habitat conservation plans, which include 
steps that the landowner will take to minimize and mitigate 
 
 
 168. M. LYNN CORN, EUGENE H. BUCK, & PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 31659, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A PRIMER 25-26 (2006). 
 169. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(A). 
 170. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
 171. Id. § 1532(19). 
 172. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 
687, 698-99 (1995) (finding that the definition of “take” encompasses adverse 
habitat modification, as long as there is a showing of actual injury to a member 
of a listed species). 
 173. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
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impacts to listed species.174  Generally, the Service requires that 
permittees mitigate impacts by restoring or creating habitat for 
the listed species that are affected.  This requirement has driven 
the conservation banking market, in which banks restore or 
create habitats for listed species and sell the credits to developers 
or other applicants for incidental take permits.175  However, such 
credits can be extremely expensive; one study estimated the 
average credit price at more than $31,000 per acre.176
3. Lack of discretion 
  It is 
unlikely that any offsets project would be economical if faced with 
such prices for conservation banking credits.  Therefore, section 
10 of the ESA might not offer much help to landowners interested 
in participating in the carbon market when faced with listed 
species on their land. 
The ESA also grants an exemption for agency actions that 
are nondiscretionary.177
E. Discussion 
  However, as discussed in the section on 
NEPA, above, the proposals for climate legislation before the 
111th Congress give the USDA and EPA plenty of discretion in 
establishing an offsets program and approving individual 
projects.  Therefore, this exemption would likely not apply to a 
federal GHG offsets program. 
In general, as with NEPA, the requirements of the ESA 
would almost certainly apply to a federal GHG offsets program.  
The impact on the administration of the program would largely 
be confined to the program’s establishment, and not extend to the 
approval of individual projects. 
 
 174. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 175. See BECCA MADSEN, NATHANIEL CARROLL, & KELLY MOORE BRANDS, 
ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY MARKETS REPORT: OFFSET AND 
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE 15 (2010). 
 176. Id at 17. 
 177. See Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 
681 (2007) (holding that ESA applies only to discretionary actions). See also 50 
C.F.R. § 402.03 (“Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions 
in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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Section 7 of the ESA creates two requirements for federal 
agencies: they must consult with the Service over their planned 
action, and they must ensure that their action is not likely to 
jeopardize listed species.  In order to comply with Section 7 in 
establishing an offsets program, the implementing agency would 
almost certainly need to consult with the Service to ensure that 
the administration of the program will not result in jeopardy for 
listed species.  Nevertheless, the agency has several options to 
minimize the impacts of consultations on individual projects.  It 
could use its own discretion over which projects require 
consultation, similar to how the Corps addresses the issue in 
approving wetland mitigation permits; it could prepare a 
programmatic biological assessment that clarifies which projects 
require consultation; or it could, together with the Service, issue 
counterpart regulations that allow the agency to perform its own 
Section 7 consultations. 
Once the consultation procedures for the offsets program 
have been established, the USDA or EPA will also need to 
demonstrate that the program and its individual projects will not 
jeopardize listed species or destroy critical habitat.  The jeopardy 
requirement would not, however, affect the vast majority of 
projects.  For the few projects that might receive jeopardy 
determinations, there are potential exemptions to the 
requirement, but the exemptions would likely either not apply to 
offsets projects or would be too expensive to implement. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Both NEPA and the ESA could significantly impact the 
establishment and administration of a federal GHG offsets 
program.  However, in both cases, the impacts could potentially 
be limited to the initial establishment of the program and the 
issuance of offsets project methodologies, but not necessarily to 
the approval of individual projects.  To comply with NEPA, the 
agency implementing the offsets program will almost certainly 
need to prepare a programmatic EA or EIS.  Most individual 
projects, however, would not necessarily need to complete a 
subsequent environmental analysis, unless it is an especially 
large project with significant impacts. 
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Similarly, to comply with the ESA, the implementing agency 
would need to consult, either formally or informally, with the 
Service, regarding the establishment of the program; individual 
projects would likely be able to forego subsequent consultation, 
unless there is a chance that listed species would be affected.  
ESA regulations offer several options to ensure agency 
procedures will not conflict with requirements of Section 7, 
including the establishment of counterpart regulations to 
streamline the consultation process. 
Experience with other national large-scale land use 
programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program, the 
Healthy Forests Reserve Program, and the wetlands mitigation 
program administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
suggests that the administration by the federal government of 
thousands of contracts with individual landowners can proceed 
smoothly while still fully complying with existing environmental 
statutes like NEPA and the ESA.  Nevertheless, the rich history 
of litigation surrounding both statutes implies that the 
administrator of an offsets program could well expect to face legal 
challenges despite the implementing agency’s best efforts to 
comply with existing environmental law.  Yet, the variety of 
exemptions generated by litigation over NEPA and the ESA also 
suggests that such challenges would not necessarily endanger the 
program or its administration. 
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